Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love by Levin, Hillel Y.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2015
Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love
Hillel Y. Levin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Levin, Hillel Y., "Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love" (2015). Constitutional Commentary. 413.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/413
HILLEL LEVIN EKINS REVIEW_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:07 PM 
 
INTENTIONALISM JUSTICE SCALIA 
COULD LOVE 
THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT. Richard 
Ekins.1 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. xiv + 303. 
$70.00 (cloth). 
Hillel Y. Levin2 
INTRODUCTION 
For generations intentionalism was the touchstone of 
statutory interpretation among common law jurists (pp. 1–3). The 
thrust of intentionalism is that the original intent of the legislature 
is the core of the statute’s meaning and the key to its application 
(p. 2).3 In recent decades, however, this approach has come under 
withering attack from scholars and judges and fallen into relative 
disfavor, particularly in the United States (p. 3). 
Although many courts continue to pay rhetorical fealty to 
intent and to cite to legislative history, the intellectual energy 
among dedicated originalist scholars and jurists has moved toward 
textualist interpretation. According to textualists, a statute means 
what its words say, and those words are to be understood only by 
reference to what the community of people who voted on it would 
reasonably have understood it to mean at the time it was enacted.4 
The move from intentionalism to textualism in the context of 
statutory interpretation thus parallels the relative decline of 
original intent jurisprudence and the rise of original public 
meaning jurisprudence in the constitutional context. 
Comes now Richard Ekins, in a book adapted from his 
Oxford doctoral thesis, to rehabilitate intentionalism. Grounded 
 1. Fellow of St. John’s College, Oxford University. 
 2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I am grateful 
to Matthew Traut for his excellent assistance in editing this review essay. 
 3. F.A.R. BENNION, BENNION ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 469 (5th ed. 
2008). 
 4. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012). 
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in political philosophy, language theory, and the characteristics of 
group dynamics and decision-making, Ekins maintains that there 
is such a thing as legislative intent, that it is discoverable, and that 
the job of a judicial interpreter is to give effect to it. 
Scholarship may be judged on a variety of metrics. Does an 
article or book provoke further thought and inquiry? Does it 
teach the reader something new? Does it contribute to the further 
development of ideas? Is it intellectually rigorous? On any of 
these metrics, The Nature of Legislative Intent is an astonishing 
success and required reading for any student of statutory 
interpretation. 
But there is another metric according to which legal 
scholarship may—should!—be judged. Can it change how legal 
actors behave in the real world? I do not mean, of course, to 
endorse the view of our current Chief Justice that most legal 
scholarship is useless because judges pay no attention to it.5 What 
judges choose to read is irrelevant as an assessment of the quality 
and potential contribution of the work. Instead, I mean to ask 
whether the work, on its own terms, offers some practical upshot. 
Thus, if a judge read it, was convinced by its arguments, and 
inclined to heed its advice, could she change her behavior in any 
way? 
By this measure—one that is surely controversial, but at least 
fair in assessing a work that the author offers as having practical 
value—I’m afraid that this book is something of a disappointment. 
In the end, the intentionalism that Ekins offers, namely, 
intentionalism without legislative history, has precious little to 
distinguish it from the textualism practiced in the United States. 
Any American judge who might find it persuasive is already doing 
what Ekins wants under the label of textualism; and any judge 
who isn’t engaged in textualism will not be convinced by his case 
for intentionalism. 
In this essay, I first identify the common critiques of 
intentionalism. I then summarize Ekins’ philosophical defense of 
and affirmative case for intentionalism and review his proposed 
interpretive methodology. Finally, I show why this version of 
intentionalism is, as a practical matter, more or less the same as 
Justice Scalia’s intentionalism while at the same time 
unpersuasive to non-textualists. 
 5. Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices: Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 37 (2010).  
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I. THE DECLINE OF INTENTIONALISM 
Intentionalism is likely the original theory of legal 
interpretation. As Ekins notes, its pedigree can be traced far back 
in history, at least to Aquinas, through Hobbes, and to Blackstone 
(pp. 1–2). Treatises and judicial opinions throughout common law 
countries adopted its central tenets (pp. 2–3). In American 
jurisprudence, intentionalism found broad acceptance and 
expressed itself in opinions that carefully scrutinized statutes’ 
legislative history to locate the legislature’s actual or constructive 
intent as to an ambiguous provision’s meaning.6 The idea was that 
the best way to determine the legislature’s intent was to see what 
the legislators told us and each other they meant.7 
Over time, a loose hierarchy developed among sources of 
legislative history. Committee reports are the gold standard, 
because they are at once the most authoritative (the legislators 
most familiar with the bill, or rather their staffers, produce the 
legislative history) and the most accessible to other members of 
the legislature. Next on down the line are statements by drafters 
and supporters of the bill, which other Members of Congress may 
view as authoritative but are less accessible than committee 
reports. And so on.8 
This approach has long had its detractors,9 but over the past 
three decades in particular it has fallen into disfavor as a result of 
a sustained attack led by textualists. There are at least eight 
critiques of classical intentionalism as practiced by American 
judges: 
1. There is no such thing as legislative intent because a 
multi-member body can never have a single intent (pp. 4–
5); 
2. A legislature in particular cannot have any intent 
because members who vote for the bill may themselves 
have different intentions and ends in mind (p. 5);10 
 6. Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1009-11 (1992). 
 7. See James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation”, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
886, 888 (1930). 
 8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636–
40 (1990).  
 9. See generally Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). 
 10. Id. at 870.  
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3. The multiplicity of sources of legislative history make 
it impossible for judges to identify an intent (even if such 
a thing could exist) (p. 6);11 
4. The multiplicity of sources invites unprincipled judges 
to impose their own views onto a statute and then 
rationalize their ruling by pointing to legislative history 
that supports that view;12 
5. Intent, even if it exists and is identifiable and 
adequately constrains judges, is irrelevant to the meaning 
of the statute because only the words enacted by the 
legislature carry the force of law;13 
6. Reference to legislative history discourages careful 
statutory drafting and deliberation on the part of the 
legislature because legislators understand that judges will 
look beyond the statute’s text to divine its meaning;14 
7. Manipulative legislators will produce a paper trail in 
the statute’s legislative history, which is never voted on 
by the larger body, for friendly or credulous judges to 
follow;15 and 
8. The public will not be able to understand what the law 
requires of them because they have neither access to the 
reams of legislative history nor the ability to understand 
it.16 
In the face of these attacks, intentionalism’s luster wore off among 
legal scholars and, to a degree, among judges. 
Textualism has risen in its place, at least among statutory 
originalists. Like intentionalists, textualists believe that a statute’s 
meaning and correct application is fixed at the time of the statute’s 
enactment. Unlike intentionalists, though, textualists generally 
(though not always) reject the use of legislative history to divine 
statutory meaning and application. 
Instead, textualists interpret a statute by asking what a 
reasonable legislator voting on the bill would most likely have 
 11. Id. at 870–71. 
 12. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 441, 448–49 (1990). 
 13. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 654; see also Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 444.  
 14. See Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable 
Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813–14 (1998). 
 15. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994), see also Note, supra note 6, at 1016–17. 
 16. See Kozinski, supra note 14, at 813.  
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understood it to mean.17 Individual words and phrases are 
typically to be understood according to their most common 
meaning, dictionary meaning, specialized meaning, or established 
legal meaning.18 Also of central relevance to the textualist inquiry 
are the textual and contextual canons of interpretation, the 
interconnected parts of the statute, and the pre-existing law at the 
time the statute was enacted.19 Focusing on these sources alone, 
maintain the textualists, prevents the harms that intentionalism 
invites and pays fealty to the law. That is, judges may be 
adequately restrained, legislators are properly incentivized to 
perform their jobs with care, the public can more likely 
understand the law, and the law itself is properly restored to the 
words of the statute. 
To be sure, not everyone is convinced by the critique of 
intentionalism or by the alternative offered by textualists. Some 
intentionalists remain; or, at least, intentionalist rhetoric remains 
in use and judges sometimes still justify their opinions by 
reference to legislative history. Moreover, some theorists and 
judges maintain that originalism of either sort—intentionalist or 
textualist—does not hold all of the answers to statutory 
interpretation. That is, a statute’s meaning and proper application 
may be indeterminate at the time of enactment and may even 
change over time.20 (More about these heretics later.21) But it is 
fair to say that the past decades have seen a broad move away 
from intentionalism and toward textualism in the pages of law 
reviews and those of judicial opinions. And it is even fairer to say 
that no one has offered a sustained defense of intentionalism in 
recent years. 
II. THE REHABILITATION OF INTENTIONALISM 
Into this breach steps Richard Ekins. The first part of his case 
for intentionalism, which takes up the bulk of the book and offers 
its richest philosophical insights, focuses on those critiques 
identified above, specifically, the first, second, and fifth, that deny 
the relevance or possibility of legislative intent. 
 17. See HILLEL Y. LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A PRACTICAL 
LAWYERING COURSE 116 (2014). 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory 
Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2012). 
 21. I am such a heretic. I argue elsewhere that Justice Scalia might be one too. See id.  
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Ekins begins his affirmative argument by drawing on political 
theory to assert that the purpose of having a lawmaker is for it to 
act as the agent of the polity to change the law when there is good 
reason for change (pp. 123–25). No matter who the lawmaker is—
an individual prince or a multi-member, representative legislative 
body—it must undertake rational, careful, and complex 
deliberate process that considers the pre-existing law, identifies 
the problems with it, and chooses the means of changing and 
improving it through detailed legislation (pp. 128–29). The 
legislature structures its decision-making process by adopting 
procedural rules that enable it to accomplish these ends (pp. 161–
69). 
He further argues that the pure semantic or literal meaning 
of the statutory language enacted by the legislature cannot 
capture the legislature’s highly intentional process and therefore 
underdetermines the intent (pp. 211–17). For this proposition, he 
refers to a rich body of language philosophy and demonstrates its 
application to actual legislation (pp. 196–205). 
This description of the nature of the legislative task and the 
capacity of language is mostly uncontroversial (though I am aware 
of no other work that so carefully and accessibly makes the case, 
which is itself a testament to the value of this work). Even 
textualists, who as we will see are not to be conflated with 
literalists, if any exist, might agree to it. They would simply 
maintain that the text of the statute, though not capable of 
reflecting the depth of the legislative process and the intent of the 
speaker, is nevertheless the full extent of the actual law, and thus 
the alpha and omega of the interpretive process, at least for 
judges. 
It is therefore Ekins’s next move, which strikes me as both 
enormously insightful and ultimately persuasive in its attack on 
textualist theory, that is critical in setting his account apart. 
Because the legislature is the agent of the polity and its very 
purpose is to engage in the deliberative and legislative process, 
neither the legislature nor the polity could rationally accept a 
mode of statutory interpretation that ignores that intentional 
process (pp. 250–51). In other words, in order for the legislature 
to accomplish the job assigned to it, interpreters must take 
account of legislative intent. The legislative act cannot be divorced 
from the legislative intent. Here, of course, lies the dividing line 
between the intentionalist and the textualist. 
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Ekins must still answer the critique that a multi-member 
body cannot have a single intention behind its acts. His response 
is elegant and nicely sets up his practical interpretive 
methodology. It is a fundamental mistake, one made by critics of 
intentionalism and intentionalists alike, to equate the legislative 
intent with that of any individual legislator or of a majority of 
legislators. On this score, he mostly accepts the textualist critique. 
Indeed, he agrees that individual legislators’ intent is irrelevant, 
whether secret or expressed (pp. 230–36). 
Instead, according to Ekins, legislative intent is that plan 
which is proposed for legislative action and that which the 
legislators jointly intend to enact through a positive vote. It is 
therefore at the time of the final vote on a bill that the legislature’s 
intent is expressed. At that moment, if the vote is positive, the 
legislature’s intent is expressed, and the intent it conveys is to 
respond to the social problem by changing the underlying law 
through the means of the statutory scheme as a whole and as 
informed by the larger body of law into which the new one nests 
(p. 230). 
This move also responds neatly to the remaining critiques of 
intentionalism identified above, because it renders legislative 
history unimportant in the search for legislative intent. Ekins 
makes explicit that this is what he means later in the book when 
he concludes that legislative history, though arguably relevant to 
the interpretive project, should be rejected in order to maintain 
the integrity of the careful legislative process (pp. 268–71). By 
excluding legislative history from the judicial inquiry into 
legislative intent and statutory meaning, Ekins thus sidesteps all 
of the criticisms of intentionalism that arise due to its use. 
In his final chapter Ekins offers a practical methodology for 
judges engaged in statutory interpretation. The core of his 
approach entails careful consideration of the full context within 
which a particular statutory provision appears. That context 
includes, first, the entirety of the statutory text, which is to be read 
as a coherent whole according to well-known canons of 
interpretation (avoiding surplusage, the rules of consistent usage 
and meaningful variation, and so on) (pp. 247–48, 257). Second, 
the meaning of a law is informed by the broader context, namely 
the surrounding body of law, meaning related statutes and other 
sources of law as well as the pre-existing law that the new statute 
changed (p. 257). 
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Third, judges should carefully consider the mischief that gave 
rise to the need for new legislation. The factual context that 
relates to the statute’s enactment, or at least those facts and 
concerns that were known to the legislature, are highly relevant 
to the statute’s proper interpretation and application because it is 
based on those facts and concerns that the legislature intends to 
legislate (pp. 257–58). 
Finally, Ekins allows for what he calls equitable 
interpretation in a small universe of exceptional, unforeseen 
cases, where the legislature’s intention is inconsistent with the 
legislative text (pp. 275–76). In such cases, Ekins maintains that 
the legislature’s intent controls, primarily because the context 
within which the legislature acted did not allow it to predict the 
new circumstances. As such, the legislature intends that an 
unwritten statutory proviso be understood to qualify the statute. 
Recognizing that the possibility for such equitable interpretation 
potentially opens the door to substantial judicial mischief, Ekins 
is at pains to limit the kinds of cases to which it might apply (pp. 
277–78). 
In sum, Ekins’s intentionalism instructs judges to locate 
legislative intent in the words of the relevant statutory provision, 
the statute as a whole, and the broader legal and social context. 
Together, those sources convey the legislature’s intent, which 
itself constitutes the law. 
III. WHAT IS LEFT OF INTENTIONALISM? 
This account of intentionalism is an alluring one, but it rejects 
the central intentionalist tool that, as a practical matter, 
distinguishes intentionalism from textualism (as actually 
practiced by judges), namely resort to legislative history. Indeed, 
there is likely not a modern textualist in the United States who 
would reject the contextual methodology that Ekins proposes. 
To understand why this is so, let us reduce Ekins’s account of 
intentionalism to its barest essence: a statute means what an 
informed legislature would have intended it to mean at the 
moment of enactment in light of the full context in which the 
statute is enacted. Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court’s resident 
avatar of textualism, would likely take issue with only one word 
in that description, “intended.” He would simply substitute the 
word “understood.” As a matter of political philosophy and 
language theory, these words might put Ekins and Scalia at some 
distance from one another. But practically speaking, because 
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Ekins rejects the use of legislative history in the search for 
legislative intent, he and Scalia propose essentially identical 
methodologies. 
The one potential area of practical disagreement between 
Ekins and the textualist would be Ekins’s allowance for equitable 
interpretation. I suppose it is possible that some textualists would 
take issue with Ekins’s methodology and conclusions in such 
cases, but that possibility does not put much practical space 
between the two theories, for two reasons. First, as already 
mentioned, Ekins emphasizes that equitable interpretation 
applies to only a narrow, exceptional group of cases. Therefore, 
we are talking potentially about only a handful of cases in which 
Ekins’s approach has practical implications. A handful is not 
nothing, but it also isn’t much, and I suspect that Ekins intends his 
theory to have more purchase than that. 
Second, and much more importantly, I suspect that a judge 
applying textualism could easily arrive at the same result in the 
few cases in which his vision of equitable interpretation applies as 
Ekins does. That is not to say that every textualist must arrive at 
the same decision, but a textualist inclined toward it has enough 
tools to work with that she need not resort to this type of 
intentionalism. For example, Ekins suggests that a statute 
prohibiting vehicles in the park does not apply to an ambulance 
entering the park to save an injured person even if such a proviso 
is not expressed in the statute. In his understanding, the act of the 
legislature in enacting this statute must be tempered by its obvious 
intention not to apply these words to ambulances, because they 
did not think of it (pp. 276–77). 
It is hardly the case, however, that a textualist must 
necessarily disagree. Rather, she might apply the rule against 
absurd results to arrive at the same conclusion. Or, more likely, 
she would find related statutes in the broader legal context that 
privilege ambulance drivers, emergency situations, and human 
life above traffic laws as a general matter. (The classical 
intentionalist would chuckle to himself and observe that resorting 
to legislative history would only make this case all the easier, and 
that there is therefore little reason to categorically reject its use.) 
This example underscores that, in some set of cases, textualism is 
indeterminate: an insight that some textualists would cringe at, 
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but also one that non-textualists (at least) take to be self-evident.22 
And the same holds true for most, and possibly all, of the few 
examples of equitable interpretation that Ekins approvingly cites. 
I suspect that one reason that Ekins’s methodological 
approach does less to distinguish itself from textualism as 
practiced by judges than he seems to think is that he conflates 
textualism with semantic literalism (pp. 180–81). He would hardly 
be the first student or scholar of statutory interpretation to do so, 
but the truth is that textualism, whether one fully embraces it or 
not (I do not), is far more attuned to legislative context and the 
surrounding body of law than Ekins acknowledges. 
A more charitable explanation for Ekins’s imperfect account 
of textualism is that he situates himself and his discourse more in 
England than in the United States. It could be that textualists 
there are more inclined toward literalism than are textualists here. 
I am not prepared to assess that possibility, because I am hardly 
expert in that milieu, so I simply acknowledge the possibility that 
Ekins’s account of intentionalism may have greater practical 
relevance across the Pond. If so, then good for him, but he ought 
to have been more careful to distinguish the contemporary 
American textualist tradition from whatever it is that he is taking 
on. 
If The Nature of Legislative Intent has little of practical 
consequence to offer the textualist (or at least the modern 
American textualist), then what about for the non-textualist? 
Could Ekins potentially change the minds and behaviors of judges 
who embrace pragmatic, eclectic, and other non-originalist 
approaches to interpretation like those offered by Richard 
Posner,23 Bill Eskridge,24 Einer Elhauge,25 or me?26 Unfortunately, 
Ekins declines to address the central critiques of these non-
originalist interpretive theories, thus making it unlikely that he 
can convince them to reject their approaches in favor of his. 
Further, because these non-intentionalist, non-textualist 
theorists’ allowance for legislative history in the interpretive 
process is not tied to a search for legislative intent, he is unable to 
 22. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW 
REPUBLIC, (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-
arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. 
 23. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
 24. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994) 
 25. See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO 
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008). 
 26. Levin, supra note 20.  
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persuade, without having said much more, that they should reject 
legislative history as well. 
To be clear, I do not mean that the choice not to engage these 
approaches is any great crime or even that Ekins should have 
written a longer book that tackles all of these theories. He is 
entitled to begin with whatever a priori assumptions he wishes, 
including the one that dominates among originalists—namely, 
that originalism is all there really is. But it is unfortunate for us 
and for him that he has chosen not to do so. It is unfortunate for 
us, because we miss the prospect of having our ideas directly 
assessed and challenged by someone with his cogent style, keen 
insight, and fresh ideas. It is unfortunate for him, because he 
forecloses the possibility of a greater practical impact. 
CONCLUSION 
There is something useful, indeed beautiful, about a work 
that carefully and eloquently explores a new idea or reexamines 
an old one. The Nature of Legislative Intent is therefore useful and 
beautiful, and it offers much of philosophical value for textualist 
and non-textualist alike. But it offers little of practical 
consequence and is therefore unlikely to advance the ball outside 
of the halls of academia, not simply because of the failure of 
judges to take legal scholarship seriously (which is their loss, as 
well as society’s), but because on its own terms it cannot. 
 
 
  
 
